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BOOM OR BUST: ENSURING THE GEORGIA
STATE-WIDE BUSINESS COURT FULFILLS
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE
Roya Naghepour*
The United States judiciary includes specialized court
systems within its baseline civil and criminal justice structure
that provide more efficient and expert adjudication in a wide
variety of areas. Since the creation of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in 1792, many states have established specialized
business courts with jurisdiction over commercial and
corporate disputes. Today, many states have business court
models, all choosing to employ some version of a specialized
forum for corporate and commercial issues for the sake of
judicial efficiency. The Georgia State-wide Business Court was
established in 2019 with limited jurisdiction over narrow
categories of commercial disputes. This Note explores the issues
that business courts are intended to resolve and ultimately
argues that the Georgia General Assembly should amend the
Georgia State-wide Business Court’s enabling statute to allow
courts to decide sua sponte whether a case should be assigned
to the business court, as opposed to a general state or superior
court.

*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 2019, University of
Georgia. The author expresses sincere gratitude to Judge Walter W. Davis for his helpful
insight into the development and inner workings of the Georgia State-wide Business Court
and for his advice in developing and editing this Note and to Professor Usha Rodrigues, M.E.
Kilpatrick Chair of Corporate Finance and Securities Law at the University of Georgia, for
her support and guidance in developing this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 2009, the Atlanta Hawks traveled to East
Rutherford, New Jersey, to play the New Jersey Nets, who at the
time had lost seven of their last eight home games.1 The Hawks
were poised to win their seventh game straight, for the first time
since 1999.2 Early on, the Nets had a rough game: the team
consistently missed open shot after open shot, Coach Lawrence
Frank received two technical fouls and was ejected from the game,
and the Nets were one for seven from three-point range by the half.3
But as the Nets entered the second half, the tide turned, and they
put thirty-two points on the board in the third quarter.4 Then, in
the fourth quarter, Devon Harris drained a three-pointer,
overcoming a twenty-point halftime deficit to give the Nets a twopoint lead.5 In overtime, the Hawks enjoyed a one-point lead with
5.3 seconds left on the clock, but the Nets had possession.6 The final
in-bounds pass intended for Vince Carter was deflected into the
backcourt, putting him too far from the basket.7 Carter recovered
the ball, planted himself at thirty feet, and put up a long threepointer at the buzzer to seal the deal.8
Carter delivered the Hawks a disappointing buzzer-beater that
night. But each team played the game by its rules, and the Nets,
with the help of Vince Carter, fairly took their place as winners,
ending the Hawks’ six-game winning streak.9 The next year, in a
different type of court, the Georgia Court of Appeals delivered the
Hawks another epic loss. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., v.
McDavid, the court held that the expiration of a letter of intent
1 Carter’s
3 at Buzzer in OT Completes Nets’ Rally, ESPN (Jan. 2, 2009),
https://www.espn.com/nba/recap?gameId=290102017 [hereinafter Hawks Buzzer Beater]; see
also
Brooklyn
Nets
Schedule
2008-09,
ESPN,
https://www.espn.com/nba/team/schedule/_/id/17/season/2009.
2 Hawks Buzzer Beater, supra note 1.
3 Id.;
see
also
Box
Score,
ESPN
(Jan.
2,
2009),
https://www.espn.com/nba/boxscore/_/gameId/290102017.
4 Hawks Buzzer Beater, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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executed by the parties addressing David McDavid’s intent to
purchase the Atlanta Hawks, Atlanta Thrashers, and certain
operating rights at Philips Arena did not preclude McDavid from
holding Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. (TBS) liable for breach of
an oral agreement.10 This time, the Hawks thought that they were
on the winning side of a buzzer-beater deal, and the ultimate loss
felt like the referee just missed a few contractual interpretation play
calls.11 Nothing foreign to Georgia sports fans.12 While in sports it
is a loss on a team’s record, a missed chance at a national title, or a
missed bonus on salaries, for TBS it was $281 million in damages.13
In the deal world, material terms are constantly in limbo. It is
imperative that the parties are able to negotiate and can
appropriately bargain to meet the demands of each side so that all
are satisfied in the end.14 Months-long negotiations and puffery are
commonplace, and the understanding that material terms are not
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. McDavid, 693 S.E.2d 873, 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming the lower court’s award of damages to McDavid in the breach of contract dispute).
11 Id. at 877 (“Turner contends that the uncontroverted evidence established that the
parties manifested an intent to be bound only in writing, and that the parties never reached
agreement on all material terms of the sale.”).
12 See, e.g., Scott McDonald, Feel Cursed? Try Feeling Like a Fan of Georgia Sports Teams,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2020, 1:18 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/feel-cursed-try-feeling-likefan-georgia-sports-teams-1540142 (“The sports teams [in Georgia] might actually be cursed.
Maybe the devil really did go down to Georgia—in the name of the Crimson Tide, Los Angeles
Dodgers and, well, that 28-3 blown Super Bowl lead still comes to mind.”). But see Alden
Gonzalez, Atlanta Braves Finish off Houston Astros for First World Series Championship
Since 1995, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/32538651/atlantabraves-beat-houston-astros-first-world-series-championship-1995 (“On this night, in Game 6
of the World Series, [the Atlanta Braves] connected on the final out that cemented a 7-0
victory over the Houston Astros and capped the Braves’ improbable ascendance.”); Mark
Bradley, Mighty Georgia Runs down Bama to Claim Its Long-Sought Championship,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.ajc.com/sports/mark-bradley-blog/mightygeorgia-runs-down-bama-to-win-its-long-sought-championship/EO6X4LNRIBDGFG4LTNM
VOFRTDU/ (“When last Georgia won a national title, Kirby Smart was five years and eight
days old. Georgia hired him away from Alabama to win a championship. It took six seasons,
but here he stands, the new king of college football. Here the Bulldogs stand, champions
again, champions at last.”).
13 See Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 886–88 (discussing the $281 million jury verdict).
14 See Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and
the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 388 (1999) (referring to the deal making
process as “courtship,” which is “at the most fundamental level a process by which parties
acquire and communicate information to each other in an attempt to discern whether the deal
is one which they both wish to make and, if so, on what terms”).
10
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final until written and signed in an agreement is routine, especially
in high-value transactions15 like the sale of two major league sports
teams and the operating rights to an arena in the commercial
capital of the Southeast.16
Many factors impact the trajectory of a given case: the questions
of law at issue, the scope of discovery, the necessity of expert
evidence—the list goes on.17 In matters of complex commercial and
corporate disputes, complicated legal issues and extensive discovery
are consistently in the frontcourt.18 Accordingly, to better address
the complex issues embedded in business disputes, many states
have incorporated specialized business courts within their state
legal systems.19 The American specialized business court model

15 Id. at 412–13 (defining “cheap talk” in the negotiation process as “a message that does
not directly affect the payoff of either the message’s sender or receiver,” and explaining that
“the whole point of sending such a message may be to influence buyer responses and hence
expected payouts from the process”).
16 See Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 876 (depicting the parties’ deal for the purchase of the Atlanta
Hawks, Atlanta Thrashers, and rights to what was then named Philips Arena).
17 See, e.g., Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of
Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 66 (2018) (discussing
some different elements that can shift the outcome of a case despite an attorney’s case
assessment early on, including the weight and admissibility of evidence).
18 See Joseph R. Slights III & Elizabeth A. Powers, Delaware Courts Continue to Excel in
Business Litigation with the Success of the Complex Commercial Litigation Division of the
Superior Court, 70 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1042 (2015) (noting that the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s “focus on high-stakes business litigation has caused it to be sensitive to the unique
challenges presented by complex civil litigation and to adapt its case management practices
to address these challenges”). In basketball, the frontcourt is defined as the offensive half of
the court or refers to players who play offensively in that half of the court. See, e.g.,
Frontcourt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014) (defining
frontcourt as “a basketball team’s offensive half of the court,” or “the positions of the forwards
and center on a basketball team; also: the forwards and center themselves”).
19 See Slights & Powers, supra note 18, at 1041–45 (explaining the modern trend of
adopting business courts in the United States); see also Recent Developments in Business
Commercial Courts in the United States and Abroad, A.B.A. (May 22, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/05/01_renck/
(“There currently are functioning business courts of some type either in cities, counties,
regions, or statewide in several states, including the following: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and West Virginia.”).
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originated with the Delaware Court of Chancery,20 the nation’s
leading forum for corporate matters.21 Accordingly, every business
court in the country is geared toward accomplishing one goal:
providing an efficient, specialized forum for complex business
disputes.22 But these courts differ significantly in jurisdictional
reach, creating a high degree of variation in the number and kind of
cases that reach each court’s docket every year.23 Some courts
annually accept cases in the low hundreds, while other courts, such
as the Circuit Court of Cook County’s Chancery Division in Chicago,
accept up to 3,700 cases a year.24 Some courts mandate particular
subject matter requirements, certain amount-in-controversy

20 See
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 101–02 (6th ed. 2021)
(explaining how New Jersey’s corporate statutes once made it a popular state for
incorporation but that Delaware’s model proved more successful overtime (quoting 2 WILLIAM
W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS AND MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW 1604–05 (3d ed. 1894))).
21 See Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 BUS.
LAW. 367, 370 (1992) (“[T]he Delaware Court of Chancery has emerged as a nationally
recognized forum for the trial of corporate litigation.”); see also STATE OF GA. CT. REFORM
COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT 19 (2017) [hereinafter GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT]
(noting that “Delaware remains the ‘“godfather” of business courts’ with its Chancery Court,
which developed as ‘the original’ business court because corporate governance cases
‘generally raise the kinds of questions with which equity deals: the duty of disclosure, the
duty of good faith, and the like’” (quoting Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business
Courts: A Survey of and Proposed Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 477, 480–81 (2007))).
22 See Lee Applebaum, Mitchell Bach, Eric Milby & Richard L. Renck, Through the Decades:
The Development of Business Courts in the United States of America, 75 BUS. LAW. 2053, 2054
(2020) (“All business courts are ‘primarily designed to provide timely and well-reasoned case
management and disposition’ . . . . One description of business court objectives is ‘to provide
an efficient forum for the just, expeditious, and consistent resolution of complex commercial
or business cases . . . .’” (first quoting Lee Applebaum, The Steady Growth of Business Courts,
in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 70, 70 (Nat’l Ctr. State Cts. ed., 2011); and then quoting
Nees, supra note 21, at 479)).
23 See Applebaum et al., supra note 22, at 2055 n.8 (explaining that the popularity of
business courts varies because some business courts, like the Metro Atlanta Business Court,
accept relatively few cases (e.g., 239 over a ten-year period), while others—including courts
in Philadelphia, Chicago, Manhattan, and Massachusetts—accept exponentially more cases
(e.g., almost 700 in a single year in Philadelphia), with the Manhattan Commercial Division
even raising its amount-in-controversy requirement by $350,000 to try to manage its docket).
24 Id.
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thresholds, or more specific criteria and duties outlined in enabling
legislation and local rules.25
The basic limitations outlined in the different jurisdictional
models employed by American business courts can be summarized
in three categories: (1) courts with specific subject matter
requirements and a specified amount-in-controversy requirement
(the Baseline Model), (2) courts with complex business or
commercial subject matter classification requirements (the
Gatekeeping Model), and (3) courts following rules as outlined by
enabling legislation and corresponding authority but with
discretion to allow non-mandatory business cases onto the docket
(the North Carolina Model).26
The Georgia State-wide Business Court (GSBC) received
approval from Georgia voters through a constitutional referendum
in 2018.27 Shortly thereafter, the Georgia General Assembly crafted
and passed the GSBC’s enabling statute, and the court began
officially hearing cases on August 3, 2020.28 The GSBC loosely
follows a fusion of the Baseline Model and the North Carolina
Model.29 The GSBC mandates specific subject matter requirements
but provides supplemental jurisdiction over claims falling outside
the statute’s defined limitations, as well as an established amountin-controversy requirement.30
At the time of the Turner decision, Georgia did not yet have a
statewide business court. Years later, in a joint hearing of the
25 Id. at 2055 (“The second model [for state business courts] is more subjective. The case
must be a business or commercial case, but only is permitted in the business court if it is a
‘complex’ business or commercial case.”).
26 See id. at 2055–56 (categorizing the American business court system into “three basic
models” and describing each accordingly).
27 History, GA. STATE-WIDE BUS. CT., https://www.georgiabusinesscourt.com/history/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2021) [hereinafter GSBC History].
28 Id.
29 Id.; see also GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 23 (“The
Subcommittee recommends a mixture of North Carolina’s and Georgia’s Fulton County
business courts. North Carolina’s model combines the objectivity and predictability of a
defined list of parameters with the subjectivity and flexibility in determining ‘complexity’
standards. Additionally, the Subcommittee proposes an amount in controversy requirement
as another jurisdictional gatekeeper for the [GSBC].” (footnote omitted)).
30 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-3 (2021) (enumerating the jurisdictional requirements of the
GSBC); see also GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 23
(recommending certain threshold requirements for GSBC jurisdiction).
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Georgia House and Senate Judiciary Committees on August 14,
2019, the committees unanimously, and with bipartisan support,
confirmed the appointment of Judge Walter W. Davis as the
inaugural judge of the GSBC.31 Judge Davis began his term on
January 1, 2020, making history as the first and, to date, only judge
of the GSBC,32 a court with statewide, but limited, jurisdiction.33
The Georgia General Assembly included many restrictions within
the GSBC’s enabling statute “aimed at ensuring that smaller, less
complex cases, among others,” do not land on the court’s docket.34 In
creating the GSBC, the Georgia legislature intended for the court to
balance having the “objectivity and predictability” of hearing cases
focused on the enumerated subject matter requirements with the
“subjectivity and flexibility” of determining which cases are
“complex” commercial matters falling within its discretion.35 While
the GSBC strikes a balance in terms of jurisdictional limitations
encompassed by the three basic business court models, the GSBC
deviates from the North Carolina Model on one foundational
element: the Georgia court is a voluntary forum.36 This Note argues
that the two-party consent rule in the GSBC’s enabling statute—
which limits the GSBC’s ability to exercise its subject-area expertise
to only those instances in which both parties agree to litigate in the
GSBC, without any judicial input in that decision—frustrates the
GSBC’s purpose by leaving cases with complex contractual
31 GSBC History, supra note 27; see also Press Release, Off. of the Governor, With
Unanimous, Bipartisan Support, Davis Confirmed as Statewide Business Court Judge (Aug. 15,
2019), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2019-08-15/unanimous-bipartisan-supportdavis-confirmed-statewide-business-court; see also Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Jones Day
Partner Confirmed for Ga. Business Court Judgeship, DAILY REP. (Aug. 14, 2019, 6:32 PM),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2019/08/14/jones-day-partner-confirmed-for-gabusiness-court-judgeship/ (“Davis has been with Jones Day for 17 years and is administrative
partner for the Atlanta office. He has handled complex business litigation focused on
corporate governance, fiduciary duty, securities fraud and shareholders disputes.”).
32 GSBC History, supra note 27.
33 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-1 to -16 (2021) (enumerating the GSBC’s powers and
responsibilities).
34 GSBC History, supra note 27.
35 GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 23.
36 Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4 (2021) (requiring both parties in a case to consent to
litigation before the GSBC), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4 (2021) (permitting sua sponte
transfer of cases to the North Carolina Business Court if a case meets the court’s subject
matter requirements).
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interpretation issues like those in Turner to whichever court one
party fancies.
Part II of this Note reviews the rationale for adopting specialized
business courts in state court systems generally, highlighting the
unique challenges involved in complex commercial and corporate
disputes. Part III provides an in-depth review of the history and
current structure of the GSBC and explores different limitations
that litigants will face if the court’s current voluntary structure
remains unchanged. Part IV analyzes both the judicial and business
interests that a statutory amendment allowing courts to transfer
cases to the GSBC’s docket sua sponte, regardless of the parties’
desires, would offer. Part IV also discusses how cases such as Turner
are better resolved in specialized forums like the GSBC and the
positive impact that this statutory amendment would have on
business negotiations and investments in the state of Georgia. This
Note concludes that the Georgia General Assembly should amend
the GSBC’s enabling statute to establish a more predictable
business court that is able to use its expertise to the fullest,
ultimately encouraging more businesses to choose Georgia as their
home.

II. SPECIALIZED BUSINESS COURTS: A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN
A. HOPPING ON THE DELAWARE BANDWAGON

Specialized courts have become an integral part of American
legal practice,37 both federally38 and at the state level.39 At the state
level, specialized forums are customary; drug courts, gambling

37 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Cts., Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary,
52 BUS. LAW. 947, 948–60 (1997) (explaining the adoption of specialized courts, including
business courts, in the American judicial system).
38 Id. at 950 (listing examples of specialized courts in the United States); see also Court
Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-andstructure (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (same).
39 See, e.g., Problem-Solving Courts, FLA. CTS., https://www.flcourts.org/ResourcesServices/Court-Improvement/Problem-Solving-Courts (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (describing
“problem-solving courts” in the state of Florida, which are divided into seven different groups:
adult drug court, juvenile drug court, dependency drug court, DUI court, mental health court,
veterans court, and early childhood court).
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courts, domestic violence courts, and mental health courts, among
others, provide each of these unique issues with the particular
attention required.40 While the concept of specialized commercial
courts is fairly new—with the Delaware Court of Chancery as a
notable exception41—business courts have quickly become
commonplace in American state court systems over the last two
decades.42 The rationale for adopting a unique forum to solve
corporate and commercial disputes lies in the reality that
specialized knowledge of the underlying transactional process is
imperative to truly understand the legal issues at play and to fairly
and efficiently resolve disputes.43 Judges of specialized courts who
routinely hear particularized cases develop a subject matter
expertise that results in quicker and more thoughtful decisions.44
This element of legal efficiency is evident in the demand for, and the
rapid increase of, business courts nationwide.45

See Slights & Powers, supra note 18, at 1040 (“These problem-solving courts were
intended to address the following binary issues: (i) a distinct population of the court’s
constituents that, because of particular needs, required the court’s special attention to
address those needs (e.g., criminal defendants with substance abuse or mental health
issues) and (ii) resource-starved courts that needed to deploy resources creatively and
efficiently to produce better outcomes in particularly challenging cases.” (footnote omitted)).
41 See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery, in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792–1992 21, 22–23 (Hist.
Soc’y for the Ct. of Chancery of the State of Del. ed., 1992) (noting that the Delaware Court
of Chancery was established in 1792 and that its “earliest roots . . . reach back to the King’s
Chapel in feudal England”).
42 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Cts., supra note 37, at 950 (describing business courts as an
addition to the already established “common specialized ‘courts,’” such as “criminal divisions,
probate divisions, and family or juvenile divisions”); see also Slights & Powers, supra note 18,
at 1044–45 (providing a list of at least twenty-four states that have established “[s]ome form
of problem-solving business courts,” including North Carolina and Georgia, among others).
43 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Cts., supra note 37, at 951 (explaining that the intricate legal
issues involved in complex business disputes justify the need for “jurists with specialized
experience” and that judges who hear particularized cases in any field “develop expertise,
experience, and knowledge” and can more effectively make decisions).
44 See id. (arguing that judges assigned to specialized courts “are more efficient and the
quality of their decisions is better”).
45 See Slights & Powers, supra note 18, at 1044 (“Some form of problem-solving business
courts has now been established in twenty-four (24) states . . . .”).
40
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B. OFF AND RUNNING: SPECIALIZATION AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL

Commercial specialization at the trial court level is fundamental
to achieving the goal of giving litigants the full court press—a
predictable and efficient forum.46 Judges who specialize in
commercial and corporate disputes are able to manage caseloads
more efficiently, in a manner that gets the ball rolling more quickly
while still offering “decisions that intrude less upon litigants’
substantive rights.”47 Depending on the scope and size of the
transaction or entity involved, there can be any number of players
in a given business dispute stretching beyond the parties directly
involved in the case, including shareholders, suppliers, and
consumers.48 Therefore, litigants downstream and commercial
partners may suffer the potential direct or residual consequences of
a decision and, likewise, a delay thereof.49 Specialized business
courts at the trial court level provide stakeholders with speedy
dispute resolution because business-related decisions do not face a
delay of game caused by other matters that often take precedence
in state courts of general jurisdiction, such as criminal and domestic
disputes.50 Not only do judges who specialize in business disputes
manage the procedural components of a case more efficiently, but in
hearing more particularized cases, business court judges also
approach business cases with more attention and nuance, offering
46 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 112–13
(1995) (explaining that specialization will “have a significant impact” on “predictability and
uniformity” at the trial level because “most adjudication in America takes place in pre-trial
proceedings and at the trial court level”).
47 Id. at 113.
48 See Carrie A. O’Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina’s
Special Superior Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 370 (2002)
(“For example, if a decision needs to be made before the next shareholder meeting, having a
judge who can quickly hear the dispute begets a significant benefit on the parties. Thus, it is
extremely valuable to businesses, and therefore the economy, to have these cases disposed of
as efficiently as possible.” (footnote omitted)).
49 Id.
50 See Andy Peters, New Georgia Business Court’s Tall Order: Get Both Parties to Show Up,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-news/new-georgiabusiness-courts-tall-order-get-both-parties-to-showup/I2LPKPFJKVHL3NMWJIAOTQK7YY/ (arguing that “[c]orporate litigants should flock to
[the GSBC] because cases won’t get stuck behind the hundreds of criminal and domestic
disputes that Superior Court and State Court judges hear”).
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litigants a forum that eliminates much of the uncertainty often
associated with the litigation process.51
For example, the North Carolina Business Court model assigns
each new case to one judge who makes a determination on all pretrial issues.52 This one-judge model offers a quicker pretrial process
logistically because there is only one docket to manage and because
commercial cases are not wedged between other matters with
priority in trial courts of general jurisdiction, such as criminal
trials.53 The one-judge model, coupled with specialized expertise in
commercial and corporate transactions, has resulted in what some
have termed “the gold standard” of business courts.54 Further, the
one-judge model adds to the judicial efficiency already embedded in
specialized business courts.55
C. THE REASONABLE CORPORATION STANDARD: ADDRESSING
JURY-COMPETENCE CONCERNS

Most business court models, including North Carolina’s and
Georgia’s, preserve the option of a jury trial for litigants.56 Some

51 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Cts., supra note 37, at 951 (highlighting the role of specialized
judges in handling everything from “discovery to motion practice, to settlement conferences,
to responding to in-court requests of counsel, to making the ultimate decision more rapidly,
more confidently, and with much less use of resources”); see also Stempel, supra note 46, at
113 (“A trial judge with specialized experience would have more of an intrinsic ‘feel’ for
performing these tasks correctly, and would need less fresh research and reflection than
would a generalist. Consequently, a specialist judge might well preside over case processing
that is faster, less costly (in both judicial and attorney time), and more frequently correct.”).
52 See O’Brien, supra note 48, at 371 (discussing the benefits of more efficient case
management in the North Carolina Model when “only one judge hears the dispute”).
53 See id. (“In a trial court with general jurisdiction, criminal cases often preempt civil cases
(including complex business litigation) because of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
trial in criminal matters.”).
54 See Nees, supra note 21, at 503–04 (“[T]he North Carolina Business Court contains every
predictive feature for efficiency, quality, and due process, thus quantifying its status as the
‘gold standard.’”).
55 See O’Brien, supra note 48, at 369 (“The American Bar Association has suggested that
states form specialized business courts, in part to increase the efficiency of the judiciary.”).
56 See Benjamin F. Tennille, Lee Applebaum & Anne Tucker Nees, Getting to Yes in
Specialized Courts: The Unique Role of ADR in Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 35, 68 (2010) (“No business court, other than Delaware’s traditional equity court,
excludes the jury option from cases where a jury could otherwise be had under state law.”).
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may argue that the option of a jury trial increases the uncertainty
and lack-of-expertise issues that litigants seek to eliminate when
filing suit in a business court.57 However, the role of business court
judges in contextualizing complex matters through their subject
matter expertise should alleviate jury-competence concerns that
might otherwise be present in a state court of general jurisdiction.
Juries play a fundamental role in the American legal system but
suffer criticism for their lack of particularized expertise in a society
entrenched in specialization.58 Some federal courts, such as the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have even gone so far as to create a
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment for certain cases.59
In In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, the Third
Circuit justified its complexity exception by hinging it on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s test enumerated in Ross v. Bernhard,60 which
concerned a stockholder derivative suit in which the plaintiffs
demanded a jury trial.61 Relying on Ross, the Third Circuit held that
it would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to allow jurors to provide a verdict when they do not
understand the evidence and legal standards at issue.62 Likewise,
See id. at 68–69 (discussing how a jury trial “increases the risks for a business litigant
because of the less predictable jury outcome”).
58 See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 186 (1989) (discussing criticisms of jury competence in corporate
cases and explaining that a juror’s “[k]nowledge of prevailing norms and standards of care in
the business world could be essential to understanding and assessing whether companies
were negligent in specific instances”).
59 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088–89 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[A]
court should deny jury trial on due process grounds only in exceptional cases when the
court . . . determines that a jury would be unable to understand the case and decide it
rationally.”); see also Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1496
n.40 (1997) (“The Third Circuit has enumerated three factors that can contribute to
a jury’s inability to comprehend a case: the size of the suit, as indicated by estimates of the
trial length, the amount of evidence, and the number of individual issues . . . .”).
60 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
61 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079 (“As our cases indicate, the
‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with
reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries.” (quoting Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10)).
62 See id. at 1088–89; id. at 1084–86 (“[W]hen the jury is unable to determine the normal
application of the law to the facts of a case and reaches a verdict on the basis of nothing more
than its own determination of community wisdom and values, its operation is
indistinguishable from arbitrary and unprincipled decisionmaking.”).
57
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in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that while the ultimate finding of patent infringement should
be reserved for jury determination, the interpretation of patent
claims should remain with judges.63 While the legal issue in these
cases focused on the technical posture of patent law, business and
corporate cases face similar jury competence issues when jurors are
asked to apply a “reasonable corporation standard.”64
For issues involved in complex commercial disputes,
“[k]nowledge of prevailing norms and standards of care in the
business world could be essential to understanding and assessing”
the appropriate outcome.65 Following the trial and jury’s acquittal
of Ford Motor Company in State v. Ford Motor Co., an Indiana case,
commentators highlighted the complexity issues that the jurors
encountered because of “the complications in trying to establish
criminal intent and impose criminal liability on a corporate entity
when those issues traditionally have focused on individuals.”66 A
central feature of specialized courts is minimizing the knowledge
gap that may result from a jury’s lack of expertise in complex
business matters, and for other technically oriented legal issues,
like those in patent law.67 In patent cases, the jury is provided
“alternative formulations” for the jury verdict, or certain decisions
are preserved as questions of law purely for the court to decide.68
63 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 377 (1996) (finding that
infringement cases “must be tried to a jury,” but “the construction of a patent, including terms
of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court”).
64 See Hans, supra note 58, at 186 (stating that jurors may have difficulty applying a
“reasonable corporation standard” due to a lack of knowledge of what that standard might
be).
65 Id.
66 Hans, supra note 58, at 186; see also Glenn A. Clark, Note, Corporate Homicide: A New
Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 911 (1979) (noting that
the charges for three counts of reckless homicide in State v. Ford Motor Co., which originated
from a traffic accident involving a Ford Pinto automobile, were “found to involve such a
substantial deviation from the conduct required of an automobile manufacturer as to warrant
a prosecution for reckless homicide,” as opposed to a civil products liability claim).
67 See Wesley A. Demory, Patent Claim Obviousness in Jury Trials: Where’s the Analysis?,
6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 449, 479 (2011) (arguing that a patent court system should follow the
specialized state business court model because of the issues facing judges and juries in
resolving complex technical issues involved patent law).
68 The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on the issue of who ultimately should
decide the question of “obviousness” in patent cases, with the Ninth Circuit adopting the
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Similarly, a judge specialized in complex commercial and corporate
matters “can provide a more informed context, and thus create
circumstances where the jury is more likely to reach an informed
result because of the judge’s case management, jury instructions,
pre-trial rulings, and rulings during trial.”69 A specialized business
court offers the predictability that businesses need to resolve riskdriven fears regarding mistrust of uninformed juries when doing
business in a particular jurisdiction.70

III. OVERVIEW OF THE GEORGIA STATE-WIDE BUSINESS COURT
A. THE TIP-OFF: EARLY GOALS OF CERTAINTY & PREDICTABILITY

Multiple contributors deserve credit for the creation of the GSBC,
including Governor Nathan Deal, the Georgia Court Reform
Council, the Georgia General Assembly, and, ultimately, the
citizens of Georgia.71 In 2017, then-Governor Nathan “Deal signed
an Executive Order establishing the Court Reform Council to
‘review current practices and procedures within the
judicial court system and the administrative law hearing system
and make recommendations to improve efficiencies and achieve best
practices for the administration of justice.’”72 As a result, the
Statewide Business Court Subcommittee (GSBC Subcommittee)
analyzed whether such a court would succeed in Georgia, with

position of allowing the jury to provide the judge “an advisory decision” but allowing the judge
to decide as a matter of law whether the obviousness threshold is met, Sarkisian v. WinnProof Corp., 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982), and the Federal Circuit, on the other hand, limiting
the use of an advisory jury to only those “actions not triable by a right of jury.” Perkins-Elmer
Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also Demory, supra
note 67, at 473 n.199.
69 Tennille et al., supra note 56, at 68 n.119.
70 Cf. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT
SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 177 (2016) (noting the
collaboration between leaders within the Delaware government and “professional
communities to ensure that Delaware law remains cutting edge and that the marketplace
knows it” (emphasis added)).
71 See GSBC History, supra note 27 (describing the GSBC’s development).
72 GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 2.
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Governor Deal’s economic development platform at the forefront of
their minds.73
Georgia has long touted its status as the “top state for doing
business,” and the GSBC Subcommittee did not ignore the benefits
that a statewide business court would offer.74 The GSBC
Subcommittee noted “[c]ertainty and predictability of outcome”
from “judicial expertise giv[ing] business interests the security that
their complex business issues will be heard in front of a judge who
has substantial familiarity with complex business issues like
fiduciary duties, disclosure issues, and duty of care” as the first of
many advantages that business courts offer.75 In its report, the
GSBC Subcommittee surveyed many different factors, including the
success of the Metro Atlanta Business Case Division in terms of
efficiency, case load management, and satisfaction of litigants.76 In
addition to general commentary on the utility of a statewide
business court, the GSBC Subcommittee considered many
constitutional issues, most of which the GSBC Subcommittee
highlighted through specific proposed amendments for the
legislature to address.77 Among these proposed amendments was
the GSBC Subcommittee’s recommendation that “cases could be
filed in the superior or state court of any judicial circuit but would

Id. at 19 (“The creation of a statewide business court in Georgia would promote all these
advantages and make Georgia a more attractive and competitive venue for business.”); see
also Nathan Deal, GA., https://www.georgia.org/nathan-deal-0 (“Under Former Gov. Nathan
Deal’s leadership, Georgia has risen to become the No. 1 place in the nation in which to do
business, a goal achieved by creating the Competitiveness Initiative, reforming our tax code,
shaping our educational system to support our workforce needs and recruiting businesses to
relocate here.”).
74 See Press Release, Off. of the Governor, Georgia Named ‘Top State for Doing Business’
for 7th Consecutive Year (Sept. 2, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-0902/georgia-named-top-state-doing-business-7th-consecutive-year (announcing Georgia as
“the ‘Top State for Doing Business’ for the seventh year in a row by Area Development”).
75 GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 19.
76 See id. at 20 (highlighting that, “[i]n 2015 and 2016, the average time for disposition of
motions” for cases in the Metro Atlanta Business Case Division was sixteen days and that
cases assigned to that court are “resolved between 50-60% faster than similar, complex cases
on the regular docket”); see also id. (citing attorney Rocco Testani’s testimony to the
committee that “surveys of practitioners in the business case division reflect high levels of
satisfaction by over 80% of those surveyed”).
77 Id. at 21–23 (explaining the necessary state constitutional amendments to allow for a
statewide business court to be established).
73
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be transferred and removed to the [GSBC]” upon the filing of a
petition by litigants seeking to do so and the GSBC judge’s ruling
on whether the issue was of “proper subject matter” for the GSBC’s
jurisdiction.78
By the 2019 legislative session, Georgians had approved the
creation of a statewide business court through a legislatively
referred constitutional amendment, and the Georgia General
Assembly began committee deliberations to draft the GSBC’s
enabling statute.79 Notably, the judiciary committees of each
chamber disagreed about whether one party or all parties must
consent to warrant litigation in the GSBC.80 The House version of
the bill specified that one party’s desire to litigate in the GSBC
would suffice;81 the Senate substitute required all parties to agree
to GSBC jurisdiction and provided for a sixty-day period in which a
party could unilaterally remove or transfer the case out of the
GSBC.82 Two paths diverged in the bill, and the chambers appointed
a Conference Committee charged with finding a compromise.83 The
Conference Committee’s substitute incorporated a series of
agreements between the two chambers including: (1) the GSBC’s
seat could be “either” in Atlanta or Macon; (2) a sixty-day objection
window, but no single-party opt-out provision; (3) a $500,000

Id. at 22.
See Constitutional Amendment #2 Creates a State-Wide Business Court to Lower Costs,
Enhance Efficiency, and Promote Predictable Judicial Outcomes, GA. SEC’Y STATE (Nov. 17,
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/91639/Web022018,
4:27
PM),
state.221451/#/cid/902000 (reporting that 69.01% of Georgia voters supported the
constitutional amendment creating the GSBC).
80 Compare H.B. 239, 155th Gen. Assemb., H. Comm. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a)(1), (3) (Ga. 2019)
(including a thirty-day objection period in the House’s proposed bill), with H.B. 239, 155th
Gen. Assemb., S. Comm. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a)(1)–(2) (Ga. 2019) (including a sixty-day objection
period and a two-party consent rule in the Senate’s proposal).
81 H.B. 239, 155th Gen. Assemb., H. Comm. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a)(1), (3) (Ga. 2019) (describing
the requirements for removal to the GSBC under the House’s proposal).
82 H.B. 239, 155th Gen. Assemb., S. Comm. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a)(1)–(2) (Ga. 2019) (describing
the requirements for removal to the GSBC under the Senate’s proposal).
83 See Legislative Priorities: 2019: SB 110 Statewide Business Court Enabling Legislation,
GA. CHAMBER, http://gachamberscore.com/vote/2019-sb-110-courts-state-wide-businesscourt-pursuant-to-the-constitution-of-this-state-establish/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2021)
(explaining that the House and Senate appointed a Conference Committee composed of state
representatives Efstration, Fleming, and Oliver and state senators Stone, Dugan, and
Kennedy).
78

79
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amount-in-controversy requirement; and (4) a $3,000 filing fee.84 On
the last day of the 2019 legislative session, the House adopted the
Conference Report, but the Senate, in what has been characterized
as an “unprecedented move,” did not bring the Report up for a vote
at all, “effectively killing the business community’s preferred model
for a business court that has proven successful in Fulton and
Gwinnett counties.”85
Instead, the Senate passed the Senate Judiciary Committee
substitute of the original House bill, which included, most notably,
the two-party consent provision.86 In a seemingly last-ditch effort to
get the GSBC’s enabling statute across the finish line, the House
agreed to the two-party consent requirement included in the
Senate’s substitute but reduced the sixty-day objection period
proposed by the Senate to thirty days.87 The Senate agreed and,
thus, the GSBC’s enabling legislation officially passed both
chambers and later took effect upon Governor Brian Kemp’s
signature on May 7, 2019.88 Governor Kemp subsequently
appointed Judge Davis as the first judge of the GSBC because of his
business reputation and expertise.89 On Monday, August 3, 2020,
the GSBC officially opened its doors and was off to the races.90

S.B. 110 (CCS), 155th Gen. Assemb., Comms. of Conf. (Ga. 2019).
Legislative Priorities, supra note 83.
86 Id.; H.B. 239, 155th Gen. Assemb., S. Comm. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a) (Ga. 2019).
87 See H.B. 239, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15-5A-4(a)(2)–(3), (b) (Ga. 2019)
(including the Senate committee substitute and the two-party consent rule in the final version
that passed both houses).
88 See HB 239, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/54805 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2021) (indicating the statute’s entry into law as Act 271 on May 7, 2019, effective
with the governor’s signature).
89 See Jones Day Partner Confirmed for Ga. Business Court Judgeship, supra note 31 (prior
to his appointment, Judge Davis led the Securities and SEC Enforcement practice in the
Atlanta office of Jones Day, focusing on a variety of issues including complex business
litigation, corporate governance matters, securities fraud, and shareholder disputes).
90 GSBC History, supra note 27.
84
85
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B. A LONG SHOT: ACHIEVING JOINT CONSENT & OVERCOMING
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The GSBC began accepting cases on August 1, 2020, in the midst
of the COVID-19 pandemic.91 Even before the pandemic, the GSBC
was designed to accommodate both virtual and in-person court
proceedings.92 The GSBC’s digital posture thus ensured that its
cases were not stayed during social distancing orders and other
public health precautions, unlike a significant number of cases
stayed in other Georgia state courts as a result of the pandemic.93
According to the GSBC’s website, Georgia’s one judge, sometimes
digital, business court has “equity and at-law jurisdiction . . . over
claims arising under 17 subject matter areas, in addition to
supplemental jurisdiction over claims falling outside these specific
categories,” including breach of contract, trade secret, and
shareholder disputes, among others.94
As contemplated by the Court Reform Council and the General
Assembly, the GSBC’s enabling statute also restricts its jurisdiction
with explicit exceptions for claims involving foreclosures, personal
injury, residential landlord-tenant disputes, and individual
consumer claims, among others.95 The monetary prerequisites also
serve as limiting principles on the court’s jurisdiction, with the
91 Id.; see also Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Opening
Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020 (announcing the World Health Organization’s “assessment that
COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic”).
92 See Rosie Manins, Georgia Business Court to Bring Timely Relief in Pandemic, LAW360
(July 31, 2020, 6:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1297410/georgia-business-courtto-bring-timely-relief-in-pandemic (highlighting that the GSBC’s “state-of-the-art remote
technology and clear docket are expected to help ease the strain of pandemic-era litigation”).
93 See James Salzer, Georgia Courts Predict Avalanche of Cases While State Cuts Budgets,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., (June 1, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-politics/georgia-courts-predict-avalanche-cases-while-state-cutsbudgets/aWZuUAY42FUTz675Rug7IO/ (noting the “huge backlog of cases built up by the
coronavirus shutdown”).
94 See GSBC History, supra note 27 (explaining the GSBC’s jurisdiction); see also O.C.G.A.
§ 15-5A-3 (2021) (specifying the specific subject matters falling within the GSBC’s
jurisdiction, explaining its supplemental jurisdiction, and outlining certain exclusions).
95 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-3(b) (listing nine categorical subject matter exclusions from the
GSBC’s jurisdiction).
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amount in controversy requirement of $500,000 for all claims, a $1
million minimum for commercial real property claims, and a $3,000
filing fee.96
Since its inception, the GSBC has taken on cases addressing a
wide variety of issues, providing litigants quick and efficient
resolution of complex legal questions and resolving an array of pretrial disputes.97 In its first two months in operation, the GSBC
granted a plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order in
Martin v. Hauser, Inc., when the court found that the plaintiff made
a sufficient showing that he “may suffer irreparable harm” because
the defendant filed suit against the plaintiff regarding the same
disputed contract in another court in Ohio and that the harm facing
the plaintiff, the “serious risk” of losing customer relationships and
business opportunities, outweighed the same for the defendant.98
Later in its tenure, the GSBC issued two orders within a matter of
two weeks on a variety of issues in Savannah Green I Owner, LLC
v. Arco Design/Build, LLC: First, the GSBC granted the plaintiff’s
motion for declaratory judgment involving an affidavit of
nonpayment and a lien asserted thereunder for a warehouse
construction and granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract in
an ongoing construction contract dispute amounting to
$668,912.17.99 Second, the GSBC granted the defendant’s motion to
96 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-3(a)(1)(B) (amount in controversy requirements); O.C.G.A. § 155A-5 (2021) (provision on court fees, including $3,000 filing fee).
97 See, e.g., Martin v. Hauser, Inc., No. 20-GSBC-0008, 2020 WL 8918287, at *1 (Ga. Bus.
Ct. Oct. 30, 2020) (granting plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order); Engram v.
Roberts, No. 20-GSBC-0004, 2021 WL 2766588, at *1 (Ga. Bus. Ct. May 24, 2021) (granting
plaintiff’s motion to compel the production of defendant’s financial documents); Savannah
Green I Owner, LLC v. Arco Design/Build, LLC, No. 20-GSBC-0017, 2021 WL 2836700, at *1
(Ga. Bus. Ct. June 16, 2021) (granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and
granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim). For an
example of typical issues in these complex cases, see Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b)(2)(C) & Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Engram v. Roberts, No.
20-GSBC-0004, 2021 WL 4260512 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Aug. 31, 2021), a motion in an ongoing
shareholder dispute between minority and majority shareholders involving claims of breach
of fiduciary duty and misappropriation, among other claims.
98 Martin v. Hauser, Inc., No. 20-GSBC-0008, 2020 WL 8918287, at *1–2 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Oct.
30, 2020) (granting plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order).
99 Savannah Green I Owner, LLC v. Arco Design/Build, LLC, No. 20-GSBC-0017, 2021 WL
2836700, at *1–3, 10 (Ga. Bus. Ct. June 16, 2021).
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dismiss the plaintiff’s defective design claims with prejudice but left
the plaintiff’s construction and installation claims, books and
records claims, and billing claims open and pending.100
The issues involved in another case, Walkup v. Steuer, make it
the quintessential dispute that Georgia voters intended for the
GSBC to address.101 In Walkup, petitioner Raymond R. Walkup,
M.D. brought a petition for declaratory judgment against
respondents Christopher R. Tomaras, M.D., Max. R. Steuer, M.D.,
and Polaris Spine and Neurosurgery, P.C. (Polaris).102 Walkup
sought a declaration that he possessed voting rights in Polaris, the
company for which he, the petitioner, and the respondent-doctors
“serve[d] as the only directors and shareholders.”103 In examining
whether Walkup was a “holder of Class A voting common stock” in
Polaris,104 the GSBC analyzed the terms of Polaris’s articles of
incorporation and by-laws, including the original documents from
1979 and multiple amendments of each document through the year
2015, the joint unanimous written consent providing for the sale
and transfer of shares between the four doctors, multiple joint
written consents outlining shares per shareholder executed in lieu
of formal meetings for the elections of officers and directors of
Polaris throughout the years, a stock option agreement providing
Walkup the option to purchase class B voting common stock, and
multiple shareholder agreements.105 The evidence the GSBC parsed
through in Walkup, on its own, is representative of the complexity
that a single commercial dispute can encapsulate and is
representative of the rationale for adopting specialized courts like
the GSBC to address these cases efficiently.106
Despite the GSBC’s ability to showcase successes in Walkup and
other cases, one particular flaw keeps the GSBC behind the eight

100 Savannah Green I Owner, LLC v. Arco Design/Build, LLC, No. 20-GSBC-0017, 2021 WL
2836702, at *1, 9 (Ga. Bus. Ct. June 30, 2021).
101 Walkup v. Steuer, No. 20-GSBC-0011, 2021 WL 1034790, at *1 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Feb. 12,
2021).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at *9.
105 See id. at *1–5 (describing the evidence before the GSBC).
106 See supra note 51.
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ball: the GSBC is a purely voluntary forum.107 Ultimately, a plaintiff
in any case may choose—and many would likely prefer—to file suit
in state or superior courts of general jurisdiction, or a federal
district court if possible, rather than in a specialized business
court.108 This choice does not bind a defendant immediately,
though.109 Under the GSBC statute, a defendant can still transfer a
case to the GSBC, but the plaintiff may object to the GSBC’s
jurisdiction and petition to send the case to a state or superior court
of general jurisdiction.110 Thus, the GSBC’s Achilles’ heel is that it
relies entirely on the parties’ will.111
The GSBC’s voluntary status diverges significantly from the
North Carolina Model.112 The North Carolina Model requires a
party seeking to be heard by the North Carolina Business Court to
file a Notice of Designation to the Chief Business Court Judge,
stating that the case at issue meets the statutory requirements for
a “mandatory complex business case.”113 North Carolina law also
permits superior courts of general jurisdiction to decide sua sponte
whether to stay a case that requires designation as a mandatory
complex business case until the necessary party files a Notice of
Designation.114 Although most business designations are voluntary
in North Carolina, superior courts are required to stay certain
“mandatory” cases until they are designated by a party for review
by the business court, ensuring that cases embodying the complex
issues inherent in corporate and commercial disputes are heard by

See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4 (2021) (enumerating the terms of two-party consent required for
the GSBC to hear a case).
108 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 50 (noting that “Statesboro attorney Daniel Snipes, past
president of the [Georgia Trial Lawyers Association], said small businesses would be at a
disadvantage at the new court because they would need to hire ‘Atlanta lawyers’ who are
experienced in complex cases and who would be expensive”).
109 See
G A.
BUS.
C T.
R.
2-4,
https://www.georgiabusinesscourt.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/2021.08.01-Georgia-State-wide-Business-Court-Rules_asissued.pdf (enumerating the processes for direct filing, removal, transfer, objection to
jurisdiction, return of filing fee, and related orders).
110 O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4.
111 Id.
112 Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4 (including a two-party consent rule), with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-45.4(g) (2021) (allowing sua sponte transfer regardless of the parties’ preferences).
113 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4.
114 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(g).
107
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the specialized division, as the legislature intended.115 By contrast,
the GSBC’s two-party consent rule inhibits its ability to address
inherently complex business disputes when one party does not
consent to litigating in the GSBC by immediately transferring those
cases back to the courts of general jurisdiction.116 Thus, contrary to
courts purely following the North Carolina Model, the GSBC is not
yet, and may never be, the default forum for complex business
disputes in Georgia absent a legislative fix.

IV. ENSURING THE ENABLING STATUTE DOES NOT FRUSTRATE
THE GEORGIA STATE-WIDE BUSINESS COURT’S PURPOSE
A. A FAILURE OF CONTRACTUAL PLAY-CALLING: TURNER
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. V. MCDAVID

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. McDavid epitomizes the
type of complex corporate disputes that the General Assembly
contemplated in drafting the GSBC’s enabling statute.117 Many
commentators have summed up Turner as merely an issue of
mutual assent: did the parties intend to be bound?118 Facially,
Turner could surely be taught in a first-year contracts class to
demonstrate foundational contract concepts.119 A deeper dive into
the procedural and legal nuances of Turner, however, reveals that

115 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(b) (describing the types of cases that are mandatory
complex business cases subject to review by the business court).
116 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4 (enumerating the transfer and removal procedure).
117 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. McDavid, 693 S.E.2d 873, 887 n.24, 888 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010) (resolving a contract dispute involving an offer of over $215 million for assets with an
estimated total fair market value of $498.1 million).
118 See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:4 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2021)
(citing Turner for the basic test that courts undertake in determining whether there was the
requisite mutual assent to form a valid contract); see also 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 167,
Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2021) (citing Turner for the rule that an oral contract is “no
less binding than one reduced to writing”).
119 At least one popular first-year Contracts casebook uses Turner in its discussion of “‘The
Benefit of the Bargain’ at Common Law.” See BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS:
CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 823, 832–37 (4th ed. 2017).
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the case contains the precise complex issues that the GSBC aims to
remove from the superior court system.120
In hindsight, Turner involved one too many poor play calls by
both the parties and the court. The facts of the case read like a
typical asset purchase negotiation gone wrong.121 But soon after the
decision, Turner became the sideline play card122 of the world of
mergers and acquisitions, emphasizing the particularity of words at
every step of a deal, especially in formal letters of intent (LOI).123
Turner involved negotiations for the purchase of the Atlanta Hawks
(an NBA team) and the Atlanta Thrashers (a former NHL team), as
well as specific operating rights to Philips Arena in Atlanta,
Georgia.124 For months, TBS negotiated with McDavid, the original
bidder, on material terms such as the purchase price, but the TBS
directors opposed the consideration that McDavid offered for the
assets at stake.125 In the final weeks of negotiations with McDavid,
but before committing to a formal asset purchase agreement, TBS
signed a deal with another buyer.126 This new buyer had personal
and business connections to TBS and offered a higher purchase
price than McDavid did.127

120 GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that an
advantage of business courts is the specialized expertise of “a judge who has substantial
familiarity with complex business issues like fiduciary duties, disclosure issues, and duty of
care”).
121 See Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 876–79 (describing the negotiations for the purchase of two
major league sports teams and an arena).
122 In college football, sideline play cards are large signs depicting symbols, pictures, or
words that are held up on the sideline to indicate play calls to players on the field. For a
description of the origins of sideline play cards, see Cliff Brunt, Funny Photo Boards Used to
PRESS
(Oct.
10,
2015),
Call
Signals
from
Sideline,
ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/article/4acdd0b2125e42a7a745d16ebdb52a50.
123 See 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO ACQUISITIONS & DIVESTITURES § 9:9.25, Westlaw
(database updated Oct. 2021) [hereinafter CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE] (analyzing the legal
arguments in Turner while explaining the nuances of LOIs in corporate transactions).
124 Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 875.
125 Id. at 877; see also HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13:6, Westlaw
(database updated Mar. 2021) (discussing the TBS directors’ dissent to selling the company
for “consideration below market value”).
126 See HUNTER, supra note 125, § 13:6 (“[O]ther buyers (with some personal and business
relationships to the dissenters) appeared with a higher offer which is what led to the failure
of the contract and the subsequent litigation.”).
127 Id.
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McDavid then filed suit against TBS for breach of contract.128
The question before the trial court was whether the parties intended
to be orally bound by their continued negotiations after the
expiration of the LOI.129 Under Georgia law, courts decide as a
matter of law whether the facts of a case meet the requirements to
constitute an enforceable contract.130 Both TBS and McDavid only
expressed their intent to be bound in writing in the signed LOI,
which stated that “[n]o such binding agreement shall exist or arise
unless and until the parties have negotiated, executed and delivered
to each other Definitive Agreements.”131 Notwithstanding the
explicit language in the LOI and McDavid’s agreement with the
dissenting TBS directors that the purchase price offered by the
eventual purchaser was much higher—and, accordingly, more
representative of the assets’ market value than his offer—the trial
court sent the issue to the jury.132 The trial court charged the jury
“to find the difference in value between the contract price and the
fair market value of the assets at the time the contract should have
been performed.”133 The jury returned a “substantial premium” to
McDavid in the form of a favorable verdict and $281 million in
damages on a $215 million contract that no one ever committed to
writing or signed.134

128 See Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 877 (“McDavid filed suit against Turner, alleging claims of
breach of an oral contract to sell the assets, promissory estoppel, fraud, and breach of a
confidentiality agreement.”).
129 See McDavid v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 2005CV101902, 2008 WL 4771243 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2008) (“Plaintiffs assert that after June 14, 2003 the parties intended to
be bound by their oral agreements and in fact reached a binding agreement that was breached
by Defendants.”).
130 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 297 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Ga. 1982)
(“It is well settled that an agreement between two parties will occur only when the minds of
the parties meet at the same time, upon the same subject-matter, and in the same sense.”
(first citing Fonda Corp. v. S. Sprinkler Co., 241 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); and then
citing Jack V. Heard Contractors v. A. L. Adams Constr. Co., 271 S.E.2d 222, 225 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980), overruled by Se. Ceramics, Inc. v. Klem, 275 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980))).
131 Turner, 693 S.E.2d. at 879 (alteration in original).
132 See HUNTER, supra note 125, § 13:6 (referring to McDavid’s expert testimony that
revealed that the true market value of the assets was “higher than the contract price by a
substantial margin,” implying that McDavid “essentially agreed with the dissenters”).
133 Id. (citing Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 873).
134 Id.; see also Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 877.
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On appeal, Turner was analyzed through the deferential “any
evidence” standard.135 In Turner, that meant that McDavid was
guaranteed to prevail because the standard, as applied, showed that
“[t]he parties’ failure to communicate an intent to be bound only in
writing following the expiration of the [LOI] provided some evidence
that an oral agreement was not precluded.”136 The Turner court
highlighted a lead TBS negotiator’s statement, “[W]e have a deal,”
when discounting the parties’ LOI despite the fact that the LOI had
expired at the time the statement was made.137 The trial court
ignored a core principle of contract interpretation—that the parties
intended to be bound only by a written, signed purchase agreement,
as explicitly stated in their written and agreed upon LOI—and
instead proposed to the jury questions of assent and market value
for a quintessential complex commercial dispute.138 And the limited
question on appeal—whether there was “any evidence” to support
the trial court’s finding139—sealed the deal in McDavid’s favor, thus
declaring TBS’s attempted buzzer-beater deal null and void.

See Turner, 693 S.E.2d at 876 (“If a jury has returned a verdict, which has been approved
by the trial judge, then the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence to support
it as the jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit given the evidence.”
(emphasis added) (quoting City of Atlanta v. WH Smith Airport Servs., Inc., 659 S.E.2d 426,
426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008))).
136 Id. at 880 (emphasis added); see also CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, supra note 123,
§ 9:9.25 (analyzing the arguments presented in Turner regarding the LOI’s validity).
137 Id. at 876 (“When McDavid inquired about extending the [LOI], Turner’s principal
negotiator told him, ‘Don't worry about it. We’re very, very close to a deal. You’re our guy.’ . . .
On July 30, 2003, . . . Turner’s CEO . . . announced, ‘we have a deal.’”).
138 See id. at 886 (“The jury was instructed that the proper measure of damages . . . was
‘the difference between the contract price and the fair market value . . . .’ The trial court
further defined fair market value as ‘the price that [the asset] will bring when it is offered for
sale . . . .’” (second alteration in original)); see also id. at 878 (explaining that “the
determination of whether an oral contract existed, notwithstanding the parties’ failure to sign
a written agreement, was a question of fact for the jury to decide”).
139 Id. at 876 (“If a jury has returned a verdict, which has been approved by the trial judge,
then the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it as the jurors
are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit given the evidence.” (quoting City
of Atlanta v. WH Smith Airport Servs., Inc., 659 S.E.2d 426, 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008))).
135
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B. ELIMINATING THE MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK: THE SUA
SPONTE SOLUTION

The decision in Turner makes Georgia an outlier on these basic
contractual issues at play, deterring risk-averse businesses from
investing in Georgia due to the resulting unpredictable legal
business environment.140 The Metro Atlanta Chamber’s amicus
brief in support of TBS foreshadowed the consequences of the
Turner decision:
If a jury question routinely arises in Georgia from the
mere combination of: (1) negotiations concerning a
complex, high-value transaction; and (2) a conflicting
account of an oral communication, businesses in other
states will be loathe to negotiate such transactions with
Georgia businesses. Under such a regime, a statement
to the effect of “we have a deal” from a Georgian on a
telephone call with an out-of-state business would
routinely (perhaps invariably) create a jury question
about whether the final act necessary for contract
formation had occurred. To state the obvious, interstate
commerce with Georgians will necessarily suffer if this
is the legal environment our State provides to those who
do business here.141

140 See id. at 878–80 (acknowledging that “[u]ndoubtedly, the express terms of the [LOI]
reflect an intent that the parties would not be bound absent written signed agreements,” but
then holding that Georgia’s Statute of Frauds did not require the complex asset deal at issue
to be restricted to writing and that because the LOI had expired and did not include a survival
provision outside of the confidentiality terms, the intent of the parties was unclear). Compare
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 167, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2021) (using Turner to
demonstrate the binding nature of oral contracts), with Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 662, 664 n.4
(2007) (describing the lack of clarity in analyzing the binding effect of preliminary
negotiations but noting that “[i]n the absence of sufficient evidence that the parties intended
to be legally bound in some way, courts generally conclude that the parties have engaged
merely in preliminary negotiations and do not impose liability for inducing reliance absent
misrepresentation, express promise, or similar inducement”).
141 Brief for the Metro Atlanta Chamber as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 5,
Turner, 693 S.E.2d 873 (No. A09A2314), 2009 WL 10666220, at *5.
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Turner exemplifies the risks of not having a specialized business
court because the trial court tasked the jury with determining
whether there was a contract when there was already a written
understanding between the parties that deliberations were not final
until cemented into a formal agreement,142 a common procedure in
complex corporate transactions.143 Opening the door for every oral
contract dispute to be sent to a jury despite objective evidence of the
parties’ intent can create an unpredictable legal environment144 and
deter outside businesses from engaging with Georgians and Georgia
businesses, thus reducing Georgia’s stature as a desirable business
market.145
While some commentators defend the central role of juries in the
justice system,146 others criticize juries as incapable of processing
complex matters.147 The right of either party to request a jury trial
142 See Turner, 693 S.E.2d. at 877, 879 (explaining that “the issue of contract formation was
highly controverted and presented genuine issues of fact for the jury’s resolution” despite
conceding that “[u]ndoubtedly” the LOI clearly expressed the intent of the parties to be bound
only in writing).
143 See Johnston, supra note 14, at 388 (describing the fluidity of corporate negotiations);
see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 279 (1987) (explaining that “parallel
negotiations,” in which a party to an agreement negotiates with other third parties and has
the potential to withdraw upon receiving a better offer, are “so common in practice and so
important to competition that it is hard to see how there can be such a requirement in the
absence of an undertaking that negotiations will be exclusive”).
144 See Hans, supra note 58, at 186 (explaining that different factors including “quantity
and the complexity of scientific and economic data” and “biases and preconceptions about
businesses and corporations” can impact each individual juror’s decision-making in an
unpredictable manner, which creates risks for businesses in litigation).
145 See Brief for the Metro Atlanta Chamber as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra
note 141, at 1–2 (warning that “Georgia w[ould] cease to be a suitable location to consummate,
negotiate, or even discuss high-value, complex transactions” if the court found in favor of
McDavid and, “[a]s a result, Atlanta business w[ould] suffer and the Metro Atlanta Chamber
w[ould] lose members to cities located in states that remain in the mainstream of contract
law”).
146 See, e.g., Hans, supra note 58, at 189–90 (explaining that studies of complex trials show
that “respondents who acknowledged the existence of difficult issues in their jury trials also
mentioned explicitly that the jury had made the correct decision or that the jury had no
difficulty applying the legal standards to the facts” (quoting GORDON BERMANT, JOE S. CECIL,
ALAN J. CHASET, E. ALLAN LIND & PATRICIA A. LOMBARD, PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS
FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR 26 (1981))).
147 See Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest?,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1387–88 (1983) (“Left to their own devices, jurors may favor underdogs
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in the GSBC, however, must remain in place because—in most
cases—deciding otherwise would contravene constitutional
privileges.148 Nevertheless, given the many details that can
influence jury decision-making in complex matters,149 the Georgia
General Assembly should amend the GSBC’s enabling statute to
allow courts to decide sua sponte (regardless of the parties’
preferences) whether a case should be heard by the GSBC; this
change would enable the GSBC, as a specialized business forum, to
address the legal issues at hand before more ill-advised comments
result in binding multimillion dollar jury verdicts.
The GSBC model provides litigants with a specialized forum and
a judge who is an expert in corporate and commercial business
transactions.150 Because it is the judge’s responsibility to provide
the jury with adequate instructions to decide the issues of fact
involved in each case, it follows naturally that a judge specialized in
complex business issues, like Judge Davis, will better equip a jury
for its evaluation of the facts presented.151

by relying upon alleged oral terms, thereby deciding the case in a manner calculated to avoid
a perceived injustice. Jurors also may lack the sophistication needed to deal effectively with
complex commercial transactions involving numerous alleged oral and written contract
terms.” (footnotes omitted)); see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) (“A suit might be excessively complex as a result of any set of
circumstances which singly or in combination render a jury unable to decide in the foregoing
rational manner. Examples of such circumstances are an exceptionally long trial period and
conceptually difficult factual issues.”).
148 See Laura A. Shoop & L. Whitney Woodard, HB 239 – Business Courts, 39 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 12 (2019) (explaining that in drafting the GSBC’s enabling statute “some legislators
were concerned that the language of the bill could be construed to force an unwilling party to
submit to a bench trial and deny that party its constitutional right to a jury trial”); see also
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ XI (stating the general rule that “[t]he right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate”).
149 See, e.g., Hans, supra note 58, at 186 (listing the “reasonable corporation standard,”
“group responsibility for a harm,” “nature of the evidence,” “scientific and economic data,”
and “biases and preconceptions about businesses” as some factors influencing jury decisions
in complex cases).
150 See GSBC History, supra note 27 (“The [GSBC] would provide specialized expertise for
the adjudication of complex cases, ultimately enhancing litigation of complex matters by
providing judicial resources specifically tailored to such cases.”); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-3
(2021) (specifying the subject matters falling within the court’s jurisdiction).
151 See Stempel, supra note 46, at 114 (explaining that specialized judges “would be better
equipped to efficiently give jury instructions, rule on recurring matters, and write expeditious
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Not only are judges like Judge Davis better prepared to address
these complex issues pre-trial and in bench trials, they are also able
to provide more confident and expert-informed jury instructions,
should a party request a jury trial.152 A typical corporate case like
Turner usually involves multiple questions of law that concern
contract interpretation or a comparison of permitted damages with
high values at stake.153 Additionally, these cases involve extensive
discovery and analysis of corporate governance documents, often
complicated expert testimony, and opinions on complex market
valuations.154
The GSBC is designed to provide efficient and quick resolution of
issues to the benefit of all parties before the court, through both its
limited jurisdiction and expert judges—as well as through the
practical benefits of its high-tech courtroom features plus local rules
and a standing order that specifically set forth case management,
discovery, and briefing requirements aimed at empowering litigants
to quickly and efficiently navigate the litigation process.155 The
faster and more accurately that an injunction can be ordered or that
a restrictive covenant can be struck down, the further the threat of
increased litigation costs is alleviated.156 And the GSBC is designed
to do just that. Ensuring that complex corporate and commercial

findings of fact and conclusions of law or opinions on motions, to address common issues in
the specialized court”).
152 Id.
153 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
154 See Slights & Powers, supra note 18, at 1055–57 (explaining that “[c]ommercial cases
often require experts due to the complexity of the issues involved” and that business court
judges are better equipped to prepare for and manage the overwhelming electronic discovery
in complex cases through the promulgation of management orders and rules relating to the
potential issues that may arise in a given case); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. McDavid,
693 S.E.2d 873, 886–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining the jury’s role in determining the
market value of the assets in dispute).
155 See
Courtroom
&
Technology,
G A.
STATE-WIDE
BUS.
CT.,
https://www.georgiabusinesscourt.com/courtroom/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2021) (showing photos
of the courtroom equipped with digital monitors at each party’s table and the attorney
conference rooms that provide a space for parties to work outside the courtroom, two unique
and modern features of the GSBC); Rules, Orders & Forms, GA. STATE-WIDE BUS. CT.
https://www.georgiabusinesscourt.com/rules-orders-forms/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
156 Cf. Martin v. Hauser, No. 20-GSBC-0008, 2020 WL 8918287, at *2 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Oct. 30,
2020) (granting Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order within three weeks of the
hearing).
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issues are sent to a specialized court with time, resources, and
expertise designed for and devoted to analyzing these specific issues
stabilizes Georgia’s commercial law and likewise creates a
predictable legal environment for businesses.157
C. THE GSBC AS A BENCH, NOT A BENCHWARMER

The ball is in the General Assembly’s court to ensure that the
GSBC does not sit on the sideline waiting desperately for its chance
to play. As it stands, filing in the GSBC is purely voluntary.158
Because of this limitation, if one party opposes the GSBC’s
jurisdiction, when done properly and after the non-movant has a
chance to respond, the GSBC must enter an order transferring the
case to a superior or state court with proper jurisdiction.159 This
“fatal flaw”160 has impeded the GSBC’s primary purpose for much of
its first two years in operation.161 The single-party veto power, left
unchanged, will continue to “stymie [the GSBC’s] intended ability
157 See Stempel, supra note 46, at 112–13 (discussing the increased “predictability and
uniformity” that result from an increased number of specialized trial courts).
158 See O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4 (2021) (requiring both parties to consent to the GSBC’s
jurisdiction, which can only be gained through specific pleadings).
159 See id. (describing the filing procedure and transferring of cases between the GSBC and
other state courts); see also Rosie Manins, New Georgia Biz Court Faces Challenge over
(Dec.
4,
2020,
7:39
PM),
Consent
Rule,
LAW360
https://www.law360.com/articles/1334604/new-georgia-biz-court-faces-challenge-overconsent-rule (“‘What we’re seeing now, sort of immediately, is how few of the cases are
garnering the consent from both sides that is required for a case to be in the business court,’
said Alexandra S. Peurach of Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, who was part of a
team that helped guide the formation of the business court.”).
160 See New Statewide Business Court Faces ‘Fatal’ Flaw, DAILY REP. (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/766f016c-3dba-4dec-9a0a34eacbf6ce8c/?context=1530671 (“Unlike other courts in Georgia and everywhere, the
business court can’t hear a case unless both parties agree to file there, based upon the wording
of the enabling legislation.”); see also Overlook Gardens Props., LLC, v. Orix USA, L.P., No.
20-GSBC-0002, 2020 WL 8881733, at *1 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020)
(“Objection is fatal to the transfer under the language of the governing statute.” (emphasis
added)), vacated on reconsideration, No. 20-GSBC-0002, 2021 WL 1435183 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Mar.
25, 2021). But see Overlook Gardens, 2021 WL 1435183, at *1 (reconsidering the case and
granting a joint motion to transfer the case back to the GSBC).
161 See Manins, supra note 159 (explaining that by December 2020, in the GSBC’s fifth
month of existence, the GSBC received sixteen cases, six of which it was forced to deny “solely
because” one party in each of those cases opposed the GSBC’s venue).
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to relieve backlogged state courts of high-stakes corporate
litigation.”162
Parties should be able to move for transfer, but courts should also
have the authority to evaluate and assign appropriate cases to the
GSBC sua sponte, regardless of the parties’ desires. This
improvement would not only ensure that businesses are still held
accountable for their actions but also would create a fair framework
to handle corporate disputes managed by experts who have the time
and resources to address these matters. For plaintiffs and
defendants alike to receive fair outcomes, business disputes need to
proceed on a fair and objective playing field. If a plaintiff in a GSBC
case requests a jury trial, it should receive one after the GSBC judge
reviews the legal issues involved—including evaluation of the
strength of evidence and testimony presented—but without having
to wait months for a decision like it would in a court of general
jurisdiction. A well-funded, specialized business court where
complex cases must be decided serves to normalize the commercial
law in the state, ultimately making Georgia a slam dunk forum for
businesses. If the state courts cannot refer appropriate cases to the
GSBC regardless of the parties’ objections, the GSBC will not fulfill
its primary constitutional purpose of efficient dispute resolution,
contrary to the will of the Georgia voters who supported the creation
of this impressive forum.

V. CONCLUSION
The GSBC is a leap in the direction of fairness, efficiency, and
predictability for Georgia courts. This specialized court understands
the intricacies and complexities that parties face in complex
business disputes.163 When faced with the difficulties that
accompany these corporate and commercial issues, there is no court
better equipped to evaluate the questions of law at hand, nor to
provide the appropriate context for the questions of fact to be
presented to a jury based on requisite expertise and knowledge.
Ultimately, businesses and litigators alike crave a predictable
legal environment with limited risk. The North Carolina Business
162
163

Id.
See supra notes 93–105 and accompanying text.
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Court has been successful in its endeavor to create this environment
by ensuring that there is a fair legal evaluation of whether a case
falls into the complex commercial and corporate context.164 In order
for Georgia to secure its spot as the “number one” state for business,
the Georgia General Assembly should make a statutory amendment
to provide the GSBC with the proper resources and authority to
achieve that same end. If the GSBC remains a voluntary forum,
rather than a specialized court where complex cases regularly
reside, it will constantly pin businesses in the backcourt, hoping for
a Vince Carter shot with no assurance that they will ever make a
game winning three-pointer.165

164
165

See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
Hawks Buzzer Beater, supra note 1.
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